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1972] CASE COMMENTS
POLICE INVENTORIES OF THE CONTENTS OF
VEHICLES AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Police officers are authorized to take custody of motor vehicles for
many reasons,' ranging from use of the vehicle in the commission of a
felony 2 to illegal parking.3 It is a common practice for the police to take
an inventory of the personal property contained in these vehicles.4 The
inventories often involve a thorough examination of the vehicle and its
contents,5 perhaps including the opening of suitcases or other closed pack-
'For example, the California Vehicle Code authorizes the police to remove from the
highways vehicles which are:
(a) left unattended and obstructing traffic on any bridge or viaduct, or
in any tube or tunnel;
(b) left standing so as to obstruct traffic or otherwise create a hazard on
a highway;
(c) stolen or embezzled;
(d) left illegally parked and blocking a driveway;
(e) left illegally parked at a fire hydrant;
(f) left unattended for more than four hours on the right-of-way of a
controlled access highway;
(g) in the charge of persons who are unable to provide for removal of the
vehicle because of illness or physical injury;
(h) driven by a person who is arrested for an offense which requires that
he is brought before a magistrate without delay;
(i) of foreign registration and have too many parking tickets outstanding;
(j) illegally parked and have no license or registration.
CAL. 'VEHICLE CODE § 22651 (West 1971).
The California Code further states that the officer may provide for
the storage of such a vehicle in "the nearest garage or other place of safety
or [in] a garage designated or maintained by the governmental agency of
which the officer. . . is a member . CAL. 'VEHICLE CODE § 22850
(Vest 1971).
2See, e.g., State v. Bean, 280 Minn. 35, 157 N.W.2d 736, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1003
(1968).
3For example, New York authorizes police to remove and store in a garage, automobile
pound or other place of safety an unattended vehicle which constitutes any obstruction to
traffic or is left where stopping, standing, or parking is prohibited. N.Y. IVEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1204(b)(1) (McKinney 1970).
'See, e.g., Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412
.(1971); Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); St. Clair v. State, I
Md- App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (1967); State v. Bean, 280 Minn. 35, 157 N.W.2d 736, cer.
denied, 393 U.S. 1003 (1968); Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 423 P.2d 666 (1967); State v.
Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 257 A.2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970); People v.
Robinson, 36 App. Div. 2d 375, 320 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1971); State v. Olsen, 43 Wash. 2d 726,
263 P.2d 824 (1953); Warrix v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 368, 184 N.W.2d 189 (1971).
5See, e.g., Pigford v. United States, 273 A.2d 837, 838 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1971); St.
Clair v. State, I Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565, 567 (1967); People v. Robinson, 36 App.
Div. 2d 375, 320 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1971).
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ages found in the vehicle,6 and it is not uncommon for evidence of a crime
or for contraband to be discovered during this examination.7 The question
arises whether the admission of evidence found in an inventory of the
vehicle8 is consistent with fourth amendment safeguards against unreason-
able searches and seizures 9 where a vehicle is taken into police custody
under conditions which will not justify a search either incident to an
arrest or based on probable cause," and there is no consent 2 to an
inventory by the owner and no evidence or contraband is discoverable
under the plain sight rule.'3 The United States Supreme Court has held
that the fourth amendment requires the sanction of exclusion to be in-
voked aginst evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search," and
the Supreme Court of California, in Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 5 has
'In Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971),
the inventory included the opening of a suitcase found on the car's back seat. The Chicago
Police Department has indicated that it will open a suitcase found in a car if it is unlocked.
Letter from Lt. William J. Nicholl, Automotive Pound Section, Chicago Police Department
to James W. Brown, Nov. 15, 197 1, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review.
'See cases cited at note 4 supra.
'The requirements set forth in the text accompanying notes 10-13, infra were not met
in Mozzetti, where an inventory search was made of a vehicle which police had taken into
custody following an accident after the owner had been removed in an ambulance.
9U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
1in order to protect police officers from physical danger and prevent the frustration of
arrests when officers make an arrest without a warrant, the person of the arrestee and the
area within his immediate control may be searched for weapons that might be used to resist
arrest or effect an escape and for evidence which he might conceal or destroy. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
"Police officers will have the necessary probable cause to conduct a warrantless search
of a vehicle if the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of rea-
sonable caution in the belief that evidence or contraband was being transported in the vehicle
which they stopped and searched. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). These
searches may take place at the scene of an arrest or later at a different place. Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
'2A person's fourth amendment rights may be waived by his consent. Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947); see Frazier
v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
13Police may use as evidence anything which appears in plain sight while they are
engaged in the lawful performance of their duties. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234,
236 (1968).
"The exclusionary rule was adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
and extended to cover state as well as federal courts in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'54 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
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applied this rule to a police inventory of the contents of a vehicle lawfully
in their custody for safekeeping.
Sharon Rae Mozzetti was involved in a two car accident in Sacra-
mento on August 28, 1970 in which she sustained injuries and was
promptly removed to a hospital by ambulance. When the police arrived
on the scene, they determined that her vehicle was blocking the road and
arranged to have it removed and stored in a police garage. In accordance
with standard procedure, an officer of the Sacramento Police Department
took an inventory of the contents of Sharon Mozzetti's convertible, listing
the vehicle's equipment, such as mirrors and radio, and all of the contents
of the front and back seats, glove compartment, and trunk. In the course
of the inventory, the officer opened a small, unlocked suitcase found on
the back seat of the car, apparently to determine if it contained any
articles of value. Inside he found a plastic bag containing a quantity of
marijuana. The suitcase and other items found in the car's interior were
locked in the trunk at the conclusion of the inventory, but the marijuana
was seized and used as evidence against Sharon Mozzetti. In a preliminary
hearing her motion to suppress this evidence was denied; she then sought
mandamus to accomplish this purpose."
The Supreme Court of California granted the writ suppressing the
evidence on the grounds that the police inventory was a search 1 of Sharon
Mozzetti's property without a warrant 8 which could not be justified in
this case, 9 since
[t]he search was not incident to a lawful arrest, based on probable
cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband, or justified by
the peculiar nature of the police custody involved. Nor were there
exigent circumstances which made the search reasonable and nec-
essary.2
0
In order to reach this decision, the California court had first to settle
the threshold question whether a police inventory of the contents of a
vehicle lawfully in their possession was a "search" and thus subject to
fourth amendment scrutiny. 2' The United States Supreme Court has ex-





21 d. at 86.
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pressed the view that the fourth amendment governs all intrusions by
agents of the public upon personal security. 22 In Terry v. Ohio,2 3 the Court
expanded the definition of the term "search" by expressly rejecting the
notion that the fourth amendment did not cover official conduct short of
a full-blown inquiry, 24 and held that the purpose of the fourth amendment
was to protect the individual from unreasonable governmental intrusion
wherever he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.25 It is thus apparent
that if a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an
automobile and the type of police action contemplated by the term "in-
ventory" is an invasion of that privacy, an inventory must be a "search"
within the purview of the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court included automobiles in a list of areas protected
by fourth amendment prohibitions in Lanza v. New York 2 and has often
examined searches of automobiles in the light of requirements of reasona-
bleness.Y It is thus clear that the Supreme Court considers a person's
privacy within an automobile eligible for protection under the fourth
amendment, and that a person may therefore reasonably expect to keep
the contents of his vehicle private.
The type of police conduct involved in an inventory is just as certainly
an invasion of this privacy. Inventories can involve checking the glove
compartment, underneath the seats and in the trunk of the vehicle for
valuables,28 possibly including opening closed packages or suitcases within
the vehicles. 29 The Supreme Court has made it clear that such acts may
be the type of invasion of privacy necessary to constitute a search. For
2ln Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968), the Court in making the point that it found
consideration of the scope of an intrusion more important than whether an intrusion met a
definition of "search," stated:
In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment
governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and
to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies
of the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.
392 U.S. at 18 n.15.
-392 U.S. I (1968).
2117he Court stated:
"Search" and "seizure" are not talismans. We therefore reject the notions
that the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation
upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a "tech-
nical arrest" or a "full blown search."
392 U.S. at 19.
21Id. Accord. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
26370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
2See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg.
Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Preston v. United




example, in Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co.,3 it was held
that looking under the front seat of an automobile was a search, 31 and the
Court in Frazier v. Cupp"' deemed an examination of the contents of a
closed duffel bag to be a search.
Further, it appears unnecessary that this intrusion be made with a view
towards obtaining evidence of a crime in order to constitute a search.
33
In Camara v. Municipal Court, the Court rejected the notion that the
strictures of the fourth amendment applied only to "the typical police
search for the fruits and instrumentalities of a crime," 35 stating that it was
''anomalous to say that an individual and his property would be fully
protected by the fourth amepndment only when he was suspected of crimi-
nal behavior,"3 and proceeded to apply the fourth amendment to. admin-
istrative inspections for the purpose of discovering building code viola-
tions.37 It is thus evident that as the California court held in Mozzetti,3
an inventory is a governmental intrusion into an area where a person may
reasonably expect privacy and therefore a search. Since the Supreme
Court has held that the fourth amendment precludes unreasonable
searches, 3 it is necessary to examine the question whether an inventory is
reasonable in order to determine whether evidence discovered in such a
search will be admissible.
Inventories are conducted without a warrant,"0 and the Supreme Court
has held that warrantless searches, with certain well-defined exceptions,
are per se unreasonable.4 It has been mentioned that the inventory situa-
tion will not provide a justification for a search under the probable cause
exception or the search incident to an arrest rule,42 and the California
court's decision in Mozzetti is in accord with this view.3,Thus, if these
-391 U.S. 216 (1968).
31 d. at 219-20.
-394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
3fhere have been divergent views in lower courts on this subject, The Sixth Circuit held
that where there was no intent to look for evidence, a police inventory of an arrestee's
personal effects was not a search in United States v. Blackburn, 389 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 882 (1968); cf United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795, 800 (5th
Cir. 1970). The California Supreme Court took the opposite view in Mozzetti.
:387 U.S. 523 (1967).
aId. at 530.
uId.
17387 U.S. at 534; see See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
3484 P.2d at 88.
3"Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1959).
"There was no warrant in any of the cases cited in note 4 supra.
"E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
"2See notes 10 & II and accompanying text supra.
"1484 P.2d at 92.
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inventories are to be considered reasonable some other basis upon which
to justify the practice must be found.
The Supreme Court held in Cooper v. California" that mere lawful
custody of an automobile did not give police the right to search it,1s
although the reason for and nature of this custody could constitutionally
justify the search.4" It may be assumed that the nature and purpose of the
custody of a vehicle in an inventory situation is the safekeeping of that
vehicle and any property contained therein for the owner. 7 When the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Boyd,"8
that evidence obtained from the inventory of an automobile was admissi-
ble, it stated that the custody of the vehicle created a duty on the part of
the police to itemize the property contained in the vehicle, both to protect
that property and to protect the police from false claims of liability. 9 The
California court in Mozzetti rebuts the contention that the inventory is
necessary for the protection of the owner's property by weighing the
owner's interest in protecting the property against his countervailing in-
terst in preventing anyone, including the police, from prying into the
private areas of his automobile or opening his suitcases and other closed
containers. 0 The court took the position that the property in the automo-
bile could be adequately protected by locking the car with the goods
inside, or, since the car was a convertible in the particular case of Sharon
Mozzetti, removing the items to the trunk and then locking the car.5 1 The
court pointed out that the owner himself could do no more than this to
protect his property if he were required to leave his car temporarily.
s2
Since the object of protecting the owner's property could be adequately
achieved in this fashion, the California court found unpersuasive the con-
tention that an inventory was necessary for the protection of that prop-
erty.5 3
44386 U.S. 58 (1967).
451d. at 61.
461d.
41See cases cited note 5 supra.
41436 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1971).
411n Boyd, the Fifth Circuit stated that the officers were under a duty to itemize the
property in the automobile and store it for safekeeping, applying its previous decision in
United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970), where it held that an inventory of
the personal property of an arrested person was necessary both to protect the property of
the accused while he was in jail, and to forestall the possibility that the accused might later
claim that some item has not been returned to him. Id. at 800.
0484 P.2d at 88-89.
"Id.
5 Id.
uId. The court also points out that any evidence uncovered in the process of locking the
car or moving articles to the trunk would be admissible under the plain sight rule. Id. See
also note I I supra.
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This point of view seems to be bolstered by the apparent policy under-
lying the Supreme Court's creation of exceptions to the rule that warrant-
less searches of a person or his property are unreasonable, which has been
to allow such searches only where they have been made necessary by the
exigencies of the situation. Searches will be allowed when they are re-
quired for protection from physical harm as in Terry v. Ohio,54 prevention
of the loss of evidence in the "probable cause" automobile search cases5l
and protection from physical harm, prevention of escapes, and prevention
of the loss of evidence in the search incident to arrest cases. 6 By way of
dictum in Cooper the Supreme Court alluded to the possibility of the
existence of such a need in situations where police have custody of an
automobile, saying that it would be unreasonable to hold that the police,
having to retain an automobile in their custody for a long period of time,
had no right to search it even for their own protection.17 Since the Court
has in this manner indicated that it might approve a search of a vehicle
based upon a need by police for protection, it is necessary to examine what
that term could encompass.
Protection of the police from physical harm would evidently be within
the scope of this justification, since the Supreme Court has indicated in
Terry v. Ohio5 that police will be permitted to make limited searches for
that purpose. In Terry, the Court held that police officers are permitted
to "stop and frisk" people whom they might reasonably expect to be
engaged in criminal activity in light of the facts viewed from the perspec-
tive of the policeman's experience. 9 The search in this case must be rea-
sonably limited to a search for weapons, and its purpose is the protection
of the policeman and others in the area from harm.6" The officer's belief
that the individual is armed and presently dangerous6' must be justified
according to the "specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to
draw from the facts in the light of his experience."
6'
The facts surrounding police custody of vehicles would not, however,
-392 U.S. 1 (1968).
OE.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
"'See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 398 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Although the search was
disallowed in this case, the Court stated that a search properly incident to an arrest could
be made in order to discover weapons that might be used to effect an escape or evidence
which might be concealed or destroyed.
OCooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967).
-'392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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appear to justify a reasonable apprehension of danger since there are
apparently few instances of harm having come to the police from this
source." This may be contrasted with" 47 police deaths between 1960 and
1967 arising out of the type of situation the Supreme Court thought would
justify a "stop and frisk" in Terry.64 Thus, it seems that in most instances
police would not be justified in taking an inventory for the purpose of
protecting themselves from physical harm.
It is possible, however, that when the Supreme Court spoke of protec-
tion in Cooper it was contemplating protection of the police from liability
for the contents of the vehicle. 5 Since it is thus conceivabie that the Court
would view protection from liability as a legitimate end, the question
becomes whether an inventory of a vehicle would be justified in order to
achieve that end.
The majority position in lower courts is that it is not unreasonable for
police to inventory the contents of a vehicle in order to protect themselves
from liability.6" This position has apparently been based on the assump-
tion that the police would be liable for those contents if any were missing
when the vehicle was returned to the owner." The California court, how-
ever, explored this assumption in Mozzettill and reached the conclusion
that there was no need for such protection as the police could not be held
liable for those contents under the circumstances of that case. 9 In the light
of the Supreme Court's apparent approval of protection from liability as
a valid end of police action in Cooper,0 it might be possible to justify an
"While research has disclosed no instances of policemen being killed, several police
departments have indicated that harm has arisen from this source. E.g, Response to ques-
tionnaire from Richmond Police Department on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review; Letter from Lt. William J. Nicholl, Chicago Police Department to the author, Nov.
15, 1971, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review.
"Forty-seven policeman, or 11% of the total of 411 killed from 1960 to 1967, were killed
while investigating suspicious persons or circumstances; 1967 UNIFORM CRIM REPORT at
48. However, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a vehicle parked in an unauthorized
manner across the street from a police station in a neighborhood where police have been
recently assaulted would give rise to a reasonable apprehension of danger.
6'The issue of protection from liability was raised in the Respondent's brief, and the
circumstances of the case support the inference that this was the type of protection contem-
plated, as there was no apparent physical danger. Brief for Respondent, Cooper v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (found in 17 L. Ed. 2d 1188).
"E.g.. Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); St. Clair v. State, I
Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (1967); Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 423 P.2d 666 (1967);
People v. Robinson, 36 App. Div. 2d 375, 320 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1971); Warrix v. State, 50
Wis. 2d 368, 184 N.W.2d 189 (1971).
6 The issue was not explored in any of the cases cited in note 66 supra.
6484 P.2d at 89.
611d. at 90-91.
7'See note 65 supra.
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inventory search of a vehicle if such protection were necessary and the
need could be met by an inventory.
Whether there will be any need for protection from liability will de-
pend upon the legal relatonship between the police and the vehicle in their
custody. If no charge is made for the storage of the car, the police will
have no greater duty than that of a gratuitous bailee, which is not to be
grossly negligent.7 1 The California court, applying the state's civil code,
held that the police were in the position of "involuntary bailee" of Sharon
Mozzetti's car,72 which imposed on them a like duty. 73 The court then held
that this duty would be satisfied by placing loose items into the trunk and
locking up the car,74 and that, therefore, no inventory was necessary.
75 It
would thus seem that an inventory could not be justified on the basis of
need where the vehicle is storeol free of charge.
The situation becomes somewhat altered if the police charge a fee for
the storage, as they may then be bound to a duty of ordinary care for the
bailed property76 and its normal appurtenances, 77 and for any contents of
the vehicle of which they have actual or constructive notice. 78 The care
required has been described as "that degree of care which might be ex-
pected from ordinarily prudent persons in similar circumstances, ' 79 and
the police may be held liable if this duty is not discharged. 0 It is thus
possible that the police could have a need for protection where this situa-
tion exists, and the question arises whether an inventory will supply this
protection.
If the vehicle is stored in an area where there is a danger that articles
inside it may be lost or stolen,8 ' it would not be unreasonable to assume
that a reasonable man would take some steps to protect the property in
the car. The obvious solution would be to guard the vehicle adequately
so that there would be no danger of such loss or theft. This would alleviate
719 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1038 at 900 (3d ed. 1967).
7484 P.2d at 89.
Wid. at 89-90, accord, 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1038A at 905 (3d ed. 1967).
11484 P.2d at 89.
751d.
7 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1045 at 954-55 (3d ed. 1967).
1d. § 1038A at 906. Normal appurtenances would probably include such things as a
spare tire and a jack.
?sSee Hallman v. Federal Parking Serv., Inc., 134 A.2d 382 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1957);
Campbell v. Portsmouth Hotel Co., 91 N.H. 390, 20 A.2d 644 (1941); Palotto v. Hanna
Parking Garage Co., 46 Ohio L. Abs. 18, 68 N.E.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1946); Barnette v. Casey,
124 W. Va. 143, 19 S.E.2d 621 (1942).
"Hale v. Massachusetts Parking Auth., 265 N.E.2d 494,496 (Mass. 1970).
'°Notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra.
s8This situation is present in some areas. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 4, Cabbler v.
Commonwealth, -. Va.___, .E.2d -. (197 1).
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any need to inventory the contents of the vehicle since such an examina-
tion could not increase the protection given the contents and thus would
not contribute to the discharge of the duty of due care which the officers
must exercise.
Assuming, however, that the police are unable to guard the vehicle
adequately, a likely course would be to remove the articles to a safe place.
It might further be reasonable to make an itemized list of the articles
which are removed for safekeeping in order to keep track of them so that
they may later be properly returned to their owner.8 2 However, it would
not be necessary to open any closed suitcases or packages found in the
car since such articles can be adequately protected by removing them
unopened to a safe place. It would therefore be unjustifiable to inventory
the contents of such packages or suitcases. An inventory which involves
no more than an itemized list of the unopened contents of a vehicle where
the police have a duty to protect those contents and cannot do so by
guarding the vehicle might therefore be justifiable on the basis that such
an inventory serves a function in protecting the police from liability; where
this line is crossed, however, the justification does not seem to be present
and evidence discovered in the process of taking an inventory would be
inadmissible.
The conclusion reached by the Mozzetti court on the issue of protec-
tion of the storage bailee from liability is in line with this rationale. The
court held not only that the inventory was unnecessary, but that it might
result in increasing the duty of the storage bailee by making him aware
of the contents of a vehicle he is storing,u as he would not ordinarily be
liable for articles not in plain sight in that vehicle. 5
Protection of the police from false claims of liability and the resulting
bad publicity might be raised as an additional possible justification of
police inventories,"6 but it is doubtful that inventories could furnish protec-
tion in this area. While an inventory might provide police with evidence
in their behalf, the false charges could still be made and publishedY7 Thus
12This course was followed by the police in the case of Cabbler v. Commonwealth, -
Va. ___ S.E.2d - (197 1).
mSee 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1038A, at 906 (3d ed. 1967).
m'484 P.2d at 90-9 1.
MId.
"The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Lipscomb, 435
F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1970), that inventories of an arrestee's property were necessary to
forestall the possibility of later false claims of loss, and state courts have indicated the same
thought. See cases cited in note 66 supra. While actual protection from liability in such cases
would generally be unnecessary (text accompanying notes 66-85 supra), it might be possible
to include in this theory protection from the bad publicity that might result from such
claims.
'Police departments apparently do not find this to be a significant problem. See Letters
cited in note 63 supra.
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the inventory would not answer any need for protection and could not be
justified on those grounds.
Thus, in the absence of a situation in which the police will be held
liable for the loss of articles within a vehicle, where an itemized list of
those articles may be justified if it would aid in avoiding such liability, it
seems that there is little justification for police inventories of vehicles
lawfully in their custody for safekeeping. In any event, the position of the
California court in Mozzetti that inventories of the contents of closed
containers found within a vehicle cannot be justified as an exception to
the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable seems quite persuasive.
JAMES W. BROWN

